

Industrial Organization

Patrick Rey

Reading list

Vertical relationships

Intrabrand coordination

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Interbrand competition

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Entry barriers

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- . Rey, Patrick and Thibaud Vergé (2005), “Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts”, *Rand Journal of Economics*, 35(4):728-746.

Tying

- . Matutes, Carmen and Pierre Regibeau (1988), “Mix and Match: Product Compatibility without Network Externalities”, *Rand Journal of Economics*, 19(2):219-234.
- . Nalebuff, Barry J. (2000), “Competing against bundles,” in *Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics*, Peter Hammond and Gaerth Myles eds., Oxford University Press.
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- . Carlton, Dennis W. and Michael Waldman (2002), “The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries”, *Rand Journal of Economics*, 33(2):194:220.
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Network competition

Compatibility

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Competition between interconnected networks (two-way bottlenecks)

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Collusion

Introduction: Competition policy and regulation

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Theory

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Facilitating practices

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Competition policy and collusion

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